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1. Introduction 
    Ever since the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders is 
identified by La Porta et al. (1999), its destructive value has been widely studied
1
. Most studies argue 
that the controlling shareholders are strongly motivated to pursue their private benefit by transferring, 
or tunneling, resources out of the listed company because they obtain all the benefits without bearing 
the full financial consequences (Lin et al., 2012). In recent literature
2
, tunneling activities have also 
been measured through inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders and market reactions to 
firms’ announcement of related party transactions, but no direct evidence exists regarding the impact 
that excess control rights and tunneling has on firms’ leverage policy. Leverage policy has again 
become an important topic since the global financial crises of 2007-2008 and the economic turmoil 
that followed, and indeed, one of the major causes of these events has been traced to the excess 
leverage policy adopted by some firms.    
    Conventional wisdom predicts that controlling shareholders should use less debt to avoid external 
monitoring from creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Lang et al., 1996), but more 
recent studies by Faccio et al. (2010) show that leverage in countries with a weak legal system enables 
the controlling shareholders to control more resources without diluting their control over the 
corporation. They conjecture that value-destroying financial policies such as higher leverage are 
usually adopted in order to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders, especially when 
controlling shareholders have excess control rights (Faccio et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the question 
remains: How does the controlling shareholder adopt a specific leverage policy through which to 
control more resources for tunneling? How does the controlling shareholder use the extra resources 
obtained through excess leverage policy: Investing or tunneling? Is excess leverage alleviated when 
the incentive to tunnel is weakened? How do markets respond to these changes? This paper attempts 
to address these issues by examining the relationship between excess control rights and firms’ 
leverage policy before and after the reform of non-tradable shares (NTS) in the Chinese capital 
market. As the existing literature describing the impact of excess control rights on leverage could 
suffer from endogeneity issues, albeit they are controlled (Faccio et al., 2010), both the leverage 
policy and firms’ ownership structure (excess control rights) may be determined by unobservable 
activities. For these reasons this research uses NTS reform as an exogenous policy variable to address 
this issue.  
    Before the NTS reforms shares in the Chinese capital market were divided into tradable shares (TS) 
and non-tradable shares (NTS).  NTS is a special class of shares which entitles the holders to exactly 
the same rights as holders of ordinary TS, except for public trading. Holders of TS are individual and 
institutional investors, while holders of NTS are usually the controlling shareholders, including the 
state for state owned enterprises (SOEs), and legal persons for non-state owned enterprises (non-
SOEs). In this setting the controlling shareholder usually has a strong incentive to tunnel because the 
share price is irrelevant to their own wealth.  
    The aim of the NTS reform initiated in 2005 was to enable NTS to be tradable in the Chinese 
capital market, by requiring the holders of NTS to compensate the holders of TS (Firth et al., 2010). 
By the end of 2007, 1,254 firms, representing over 97% of the Chinese A-share market capitalization 
at the time, had completely reformed (Li et al., 2011).  
    This reform should have reduced the incentive of controlling shareholders’ to tunnel because they 
can now sell their shares at market price after the lock-up period expires, which effectively ties the 
share price closer to the wealth of the controlling shareholder. So now the controlling shareholder 
cares more about the share price and possible punishment from the capital market. More importantly, 
NTS reform has an exogenous impact because the Chinese government implements them for all listed 
firms. These reforms provide us with a unique institutional environment, without an endogeneity bias, 
to examine the effect that the controlling shareholder has on a firm’s leverage decision.  
                                                          
1 See, for example, Claessens et al. (2000), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), 
Maury and Pajuste (2004), Wei and Zhang (2008), Gompers et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2011a), Lin et al. (2011b), and Lin et al. 
(2012). 
2 See, for example, Cheung et al. (2006), Jiang et al. (2010), Peng et al. (2011). 
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    Our empirical results show that the excess control rights of controlling shareholders is positively 
associated to excess leverage, which is consistent with previous literature such as Faccio et al. (2010). 
Moreover the high excess leverage in firms with excess control rights is associated with more inter-
corporate loans to controlling shareholders rather than more investments in positive NPV projects, 
which confirms our tunneling story. By examining how NTS reform affect the relationship between 
excess control rights and firms’ leverage policy, we find that firms with excess control rights reduce 
their use of excess leverage after the reform, but to prove that such a reduction in excess leverage is 
affected by controlling shareholders’ tunneling rather than other factors, we conduct several additional 
tests. 
    We begin by conducting a change regression with control for market timing as the decrease of 
excess leverage after NTS reform can also be attributed to market timing, and find that while market 
timing has changed firm leverage, excess control rights still have incremental power of explanation.  
We then find that inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders in firms with excess control rights 
also decreased, so we provide further evidence that after NTS reform, investors are more likely to 
react positively when firms announce a related party transaction. These results do suggest that the 
incentive for tunneling by the controlling shareholder decreases after NTS reform.  
    We also examine other factors that influence the relationship between excess control rights and 
firms’ leverage decision and find that the leverage of firms with excess control rights decreases 
significantly, particularly those firms taking part in related party transactions and those with lower 
bank monitoring. This indicates that our main results are robust because participation in related party 
transactions and lower bank monitoring can result in more tunneling from controlling shareholders. 
We further show that firms with excess control rights perform better after NTS reform, which also 
supports our arguments. Finally, our analysis focuses on the pre and post NTS reform period, but it 
exclude the full flotation period in order to keep any shock from the NTS reform more exogenous
3
. 
For completeness, we also examine how the full flotation of NTS affects firms’ excess leverage, and 
find that it had has no significant impact on firms’ leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ 
tunneling. Overall, our additional tests provide more direct evidence for our principle hypothesis, 
indicating that our main results are robust. 
    This study contributes to current literature because existing literature on the impact of ownership 
structure (excess control rights) on firm’s leverage policy and performance could suffer from 
endogeneity, even though they are controlled. Using NTS reform as an exogenous shock, our results 
provide findings that greatly alleviated the endogeneity issues which extend the existing literature. 
Second, we extend Faccio et al. (2010)’s study on excess control rights and firms’ leverage policy by 
proving that controlling shareholders of firms with excess control rights use their excess leverage to 
tunnel rather than invest it in positive NPV projects. Previous studies of the consequences of NTS 
reform mainly focused on how it affects CEO compensation incentives, stock market fundamentals, or 
stock market activity (Beltratti et al., 2010; Campello et al., 2010; Qing and Lin, 2011). This paper 
enriches this literature by finding evidence that firms’ excess leverage is markedly alleviated when 
tunneling by controlling shareholders is reduced after NTS reform. Finally, we compare firms’ 
leverage policy before and after NTS reform, under the institutional environment within China, the 
largest emerging market of the world. Fan et al. (2011) indicate that the corporate financial and 
managerial behavior of firms in emerging markets are usually influenced by various institutional 
factors quite different to those  in developed markets. Studies focused on separate countries allow 
researchers to analyze the impact of ownership structure on firms’ leverage decisions in more detail 
(Fan et al., 2011). Therefore our paper has important implications for understanding the financial 
policy of firms in emerging markets.  
                                                          
3 During the lockup period (post reform period), where controlling shareholders are allowed to sell a very limited percentage 
of their holdings, the pyramid ownership structure is barely influenced by any other factor, so  we conduct our regressions 
using a sample of Chinese non-SOEs pre and post the NTS reform period (the latter is the lock up period). The excess 
control rights become less exogenous after the shares were fully floated, when the lockup period has expired. Controlling 
shareholders could then increase or decrease their holdings, and therefore the ownership structure will be affected by other 
factors. In addition, during the pre reform period, controlling shareholders are barely able to change the pyramid ownership 
structure, which was inherited and adopted before the firms were listed in the markets, by buying and selling their non-
tradable shares in over-the-counter markets. 
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    The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains NTS reform and develops 
several testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes how the variables are measured and the methodology 
chosen. Section 4 presents our main empirical results and interpretation, and section 5 summarizes the 
main conclusions of this research. 
2. NTS reform in the Chinese capital market and development of the hypothesis  
2.1. Institutional background and NTS reform in the Chinese capital market 
    A characteristic of the Chinese capital market before NTS reform was a split share structure where 
almost 70 per cent of listed firms’ outstanding shares were NTS and mainly held by block holders, 
including controlling shareholders, while the remaining shares were tradable and mainly held by 
domestic individuals and institutional investors (Firth et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011).  
    Many studies suggest that this split share structure creates a number of problems (see, e.g., Fan and 
Wong, 2002; Sun and Tong, 2004) such as a conflict of interest between controlling (non-tradable) 
and minority (tradable) shareholders because the wealth of controlling shareholders is insulated from 
the share price. Under these circumstances controlling (non-tradable) shareholders tend to tunnel 
resources (often through related party transactions) out of listed firms at the expense of tradable 
shareholders (see Cheung et al., 2006; Jian and Wong, 2010), which resulted  in a large number of 
inter-corporate loans in firms’ balance sheets (Jiang et al., 2010). This caused the Chinese government 
in 2005 to reform the NTS and solve the problems associated with a split share structure.  
    To implement this reform the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced two 
batches of pilot reforms that involved 4 and 42 listed companies in April and June 2005 respectively. 
In August 2005, the reform was expanded to include all listed firms, and by the end of 2007, the 
reform represented over 97% of total Chinese A-share market capitalization (Li et al., 2011) 
companies. To dilute any possible stock overhang from a massive sale of shares, NTS holders could 
only trade limited shares gradually within the lockup period. Firms usually became fully floated (fully 
tradable) 36 months after the reforms were completed
4
.  
    Figure 1 presents a time line of the change in status of TS for a firm after NTS reform. All NTS are 
non-tradable before day t1, which is normally 1 year after the NTS reform was completed. Between 
the period t1 and t2, shares held by small NTS holders (called xiaofei in Chinese) with less than 5% of 
a firm’s outstanding shares, become tradable, while large NTS holders (called dafei in Chinese), 
including controlling shareholders, were allowed to trade a small proportion of their shares, usually 
less than 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares. Then, between t2 and t3, large NTS holders were usually 
allowed to trade their shares that were less than 10% of the firm’s outstanding shares. Finally, all NTS 
become tradable after t3. 
 
Figure 1.  Change of tradable share status after NTS reform. 
 
                                                          
4 Usually there was a 12 month lockup period for NTS holders with less than 5% of total outstanding shares of the company. 
However, NTS holders owning more than 5% of the listed firms were further prohibited from trading on the stock exchange 
when more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share capital were within 12 (24) months (Beltratti et al., 2010). 
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2.2 Development of Hypothesis  
2.2.1. Excess control rights and firms’ leverage policy 
    As discussed above, previous literature implies that excess control rights are associated with more 
tunneling by controlling shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002). More recent 
studies by Faccio et al. (2010) show that leverage enables controlling shareholders to control more 
resources without diluting their control over the corporation. They further document that in transition 
economies where creditor protection is weak, controlling shareholders with more excess control rights 
usually have an incentive to use more debt to expand their control of resources in order to commence 
tunneling. As a typical transition economy, China has a weak legal system that provides weak 
protection for creditors (Peng, 2001). As an example, bankruptcy laws are often poorly enforced and 
courts are often very costly for resolving conflicts (Fan et al., 2011). It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that the excess control rights of Chinese firms are also associated with high excess leverage 
due to controlling shareholders’ tunneling activities. We define excess leverage as the difference 
between a firm’s leverage and optimal leverage, measured by the industrial median leverage level of 
all Chinese listed firms in a specific year, and developed the following hypothesis to support this 
argument: 
H1: The excess control rights of the controlling shareholder are positively associated to a firm’s 
excess leverage. 
2.2.2. How controlling shareholders use the excess resources associated with excess control rights 
    Previous studies indicate that excess control rights have a positive effect on firms’ leverage policy 
due to tunneling by controlling shareholders when creditor protection is weak. The underlying 
economic rationale is neither simple nor direct, so to provide more evidence for our argument, we 
attempt to link excess control rights and excess leverage to inter-corporate loans, which is one of the 
direct measures of controlling shareholders’ tunneling (Jiang et al., 2010). From this we expect that if 
controlling shareholders of firms with excess control rights use the associated high excess leverage for 
tunneling, these firms should have more inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders. On this 
basis we develop the following hypothesis: 
H2a: The interaction of excess control rights and excess leverage is positively associated to inter-
corporate loans to the controlling shareholder. 
    However, firms with more excess control rights might use these resources to invest in new positive 
NPV projects, so we have one alternative hypothesis: 
H2b: The interaction of excess control rights and excess leverage is positively associated to capital 
expenditure. 
2.2.3. How firms’ leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ tunneling changed after NTS reform 
    NTS reform is expected to reduce the controlling shareholder’s incentive for tunneling in firms 
with excess control rights because they must consider punishment from the market after the reform 
than before (Campello et al., 2011). We expect that NTS reform might weaken the relationship 
between excess control rights and firms’ excess leverage, so we establish the following hypothesis to 
prove this argument: 
H3a: The interaction of excess control rights and NTS reform is negatively associated to firms’ excess 
leverage. 
    Similarly, tunneling by controlling shareholders as measured by inter-corporate loans in firms with 
more excess control rights should also decrease after NTS reform so we develop the following 
hypothesis: 
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H3b: The interaction of excess control rights and NTS reform is negatively related to inter-corporate 
loans. 
2.2.4. How minority shareholders react when firms announce related party transactions 
    Previous studies show that tunneling and propping by controlling shareholders may lead to different 
market reactions when firms announce a related party transaction that is usually measured by market 
adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Specifically, announcing a tunneling activity may result 
in a negative market reaction while an announcement of propping is associated with a positive 
reaction (Cheung et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2011). Because the incentive for controlling shareholders to 
tunnel decreased after NTS reform, we expect more propping announcements to be made after NTS 
reform than before, so we hypothesize that: 
H4: The interaction of excess control rights and NTS reform is positively related to CAR when firms 
announce related party transactions. 
3. Methodology and Measurement of Variables 
3.1 Data Collection 
    The data used in this paper comes mainly from a series of datasets from the CSMAR database: The 
Chinese Listed Firm Annual Report Database (2004–2010); The Chinese Listed Firm Corporate 
Governance Database (2004–2010); The Chinese listed firm Non-tradable share reform database 
(2005-2008); The Chinese Stock Market Index Return Database (2004-2010); The Chinese Listed 
Company Connected Party Transactions Database (2004-2010). As indicated in earlier studies, the 
CSMAR is the most important and most widely used database on the Chinese capital market.   
Our research period is from 2004 because since then all Chinese listed firms have been required by 
the CSRC to list the identities of their ultimate owners as well as the control chains in their annual 
reports. The CSRC defines the “ultimate owner” of a publicly listed company as: (1) the largest 
shareholder, or (2) the shareholder with more voting power than the largest shareholder, or (3) the 
shareholder with shareholding or voting rights above 30% of the total shares, or voting rights in the 
company, or (4) the shareholder who can determine over half of the board members.  
    We exclude: (1) SOEs (firms with the state as the controlling shareholder)
5
, (2) Financial firms 
(firms with unique accounting standards and capital structure), (3) ‘ST’ firms or negative-equity firms 
(financial distressed firms), (4) firms who went public after the NTS reform finished
6
, and (5) firms 
whose relevant data are not complete or cannot be acquired. The final sample consists of 2,215 firm-
year observations from 2004 to 2010, and includes all the 12 industries in the Chinese capital market 
(According to the industry classification of CSRC. Listed firms in the Chinese capital market are 
classified into 12 industries, Manufacturing, Agriculture, Mining, Hot water and electricity, 
Construction, Transportation, Information technology, Wholesale &Retail, Real-estate, Social service, 
Culture &Broadcasting, and Comprehensive). To the best of our knowledge this is the largest data 
sample for publicly listed Chinese non state-owned firms available to us.  
    We divide our full sample of 2,215 observations into three sub-samples, including the prior reform 
period (740 observations), post reform period (1,057 observations), and the flotation period (418 
observations). We mainly focus on the impact of the reform by comparing excess leverage between 
the prior and post reform periods. Prior reform covers the period from 2004 to the year when a firms’ 
reform is completed, while the post reform covers the lockup period. This results in 1,797 firm year 
                                                          
5 We exclude SOEs because most of the listed firms around the world are non-state owned and previous  studies on this topic 
also focused on non-SOEs (Claessens et al. (2000); Claessens et al. (2002); Faccio et al. (2010); Second, Chinese non-SOEs 
have a similar ownership structure and corporate governance characteristics to firms in other East Asia countries, as 
documented by Faccio et al. (2010); Third, SOEs in China have different objectives and principal–agent framework, 
compared to these non-SOEs, so the main agency issue in SOEs is the agency conflict between shareholders and managers 
rather than between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Rousseau and Xiao, 2007). 
6
 We exclude these types of firms because they did not implement NTS reform and we cannot compare the relationship 
between excess control rights and leverage decision before and after NTS reform. 
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observations in our main sample. To complete our study we also compare excess leverage in the post 
reform period to the flotation period with 1,475 observations.  
3.2 Measuring Variables 
3.2.1 Excess leverage 
    Following previous studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Antoniou et al., 2008), 
we take advantage of the book value and market value based leverage ratios as proxies of firms’ 
leverage, and also use a firm’s leverage minus the optimal leverage measured by the industrial median 
book/market leverage level of all Chinese listed firms, to measure firms’ excess leverage. We then 
create two new variables for our regressions, the excess book value based leverage (EX_BLEV) and 
the excess market value based leverage (EX_MLEV)
7
.   
3.2.2 Controlling shareholders’ tunneling 
    In this study we measure the controlling shareholder’s tunneling based on two variables: the first 
being inter-corporate loans (also called funds occupation) developed by Jiang, Lee and Yue (2010), 
the second being the CAR when a firm announces a related party transaction (Cheung et al., 2006).  
    Inter-corporate loan is a primary tool which controlling shareholders use for tunneling. Although 
the CSRC has issued repeated warnings and made its disclosure mandatory, weak regulatory 
enforcement has meant that the practice has not abated. Following Jiang et al. (2010), this study uses 
other receivables to total assets (ORECTA) to measure inter-corporate loans to controlling 
shareholders.  
    Related party transactions (RPTs), which refer to the transactions between the firm and its 
controlling shareholder, are another tool that is widely used by the controlling shareholder for 
tunneling. However, as it is difficult to justify whether a RPT is value-destroying or enhancing, this 
study uses the daily market adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CARs around the announcement of 
RPTs) to measure the value of RPTs. In addition, we also calculate long-horizon abnormal returns 
(CAR [MONTH 0]) for the month of the announcement of RPTs (month 0), following previous 
studies such as Ikenberry et al. (1995), Cheung et al. (2006)
8
. We calculate the long-horizon abnormal 
returns based on the four benchmarks
9
 as indicated by Cheung et al. (2006). Moreover, Chinese firms 
are required to announce the RPTs on the financial statement and interim announcements within two 
working days after a contract has been signed. This study only includes the interim announcements 
for RPTs in order to eliminate other factors that impact on market reactions to announcements of 
financial statements. Finally, listed firms in China announce RPTs with both their affiliates and 
controlling shareholders. We only include those RPTs with controlling shareholders because RPTs 
with affiliates should not result in tunneling or propping by the controlling shareholders.  
3.2.3 NTS reform 
    We define a dummy variable ‘REFORM’ that equals to 1 for a firm year observation in the post 
reform period, and equals to 0 for observations before NTS reform.  To examine how the flotation of 
NTS affect firm’s leverage policy and controlling shareholder’s tunneling, we also include another 
dummy variable ‘FLOTATION’ that equals to 1 for observations in the flotation period when all the 
shares held by controlling shareholders become tradable, and equals to 0 for observations in the post 
reform period. 
3.2.4 Excess control rights of the controlling shareholder 
    The definition of cash flows rights and control rights of the ultimate owners is the same as in 
Claessens et al. (2002) and Faccio and Lang (2002), where cash flow rights are measured by the sum 
                                                          
7
 To check for robustness, we also use a firms’ leverage as dependent variables and find that all the results using excess 
leverage as dependent variables are similar to ours. 
8 Longer horizon abnormal returns such as 12 months pre/post the announcement of related party transactions as indicated by 
Cheung et al. (2006) are not included in our paper because the period is too long to overlap with the NTS event. 
9 The four benchmarks are size, industry, size and industry, and size and market to book.  To save space we only report the 
results based on size and market to book benchmark.  
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of the products of the proportion of ownership along the control chains, and the control rights are 
measured by the minimum proportion of ownership along the control chains. We compute the 
following two variables to measure the excess control rights of Chinese private firms, (1) the ‘excess 
control (EXCESS)’ are computed by subtracting the cash flow rights from the control rights, and (2) 
the ‘separate dummy (SDUMMY)’, which equals to 1 if the control rights of the ultimate shareholder 
exceed the cash flow rights. 
3.2.5 Other variables 
We also include several other dependent and independent (control) variables in our regression, 
including firms’ financial characteristics and corporate governance variables. A detailed definition 
and calculation of all the variables used in this paper is reported in Appendix A. 
3.3 Regression Model 
    In this paper we establish the following equation as basic regression models. 
, 0 1 , 2 ,
3
Excess leverage/Tunneling =α +βexcess control +β control variable
+  Year and Industry dummies+ε
i t i t i t
β                       Equation (1) 
, 0 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 ,
5
Excess leverage/Tunneling =α +βexcess control +β Reform Dummy
+β excess control* Reform Dummy +β control variable
+  Year and Industry dummies+ε
i t i t i t
i t i t
β                       Equation (2)
 
    In these equations the dependent variables for ‘Excess leverage’ can be excess book value based 
leverage (EX_BLEV) and excess market value based leverage (EX_MLEV), while the dependent 
variables for ‘Tunneling’ can be inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders (ORECTA) and 
accumulated abnormal returns (CARs) for the announcement of RPTs. The key independent variables 
are proxies for excess control rights and NTS reform. Other independent variables include firm 
characteristics, corporate governance, and industry and year dummies. To provide more robust results, 
we conduct an OLS regression and firm fixed effect regression and reported the results in our paper10.  
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Sample description and univariate test 
    Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample where panel A reports the summary 
statistics for the full sample, while panels B, C, and D present the uni-variate tests of the main 
dependent variables based on different classifications of the sample. We adopt the difference in 
difference (DID) method, where firms without excess control rights are used as a control group to 
examine the change in leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ tunneling before and after NTS 
reform. 
    The results in panel A show that the average book and market value based excess leverage for our 
sample were 3.62 per cent and 9.00 per cent respectively, while other receivables account for 
approximately 3.52 percent of total assets on average. Jiang et al. (2010) show that the average 
ORECTA during 1996 to 2004 was 8.1 per cent, so our results indicate that the tunneling activities 
measured by inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders decreased markedly in recent years. 
Further, the average capital expenditure accounts for 10.84 per cent of   total assets and the average 
cumulative abnormal returns (measured by CAR [-1, +1]; CAR [-2, +2]; CAR [-5, +5] and CAR 
[MONTH 0]) around the announcement of RPTs are 0.84, 0.48, 0.63 and 0.98 per cent. We also show 
that about 83 per cent of Chinese non-SOEs have excess control rights, the average excess control 
                                                          
10  To control the unobservable heterogeneity of different firms, we conduct firm fixed effect regressions for all our 
regression models with more than one observation for each firm. But due to space limitations, we just report the firm fixed 
effect of our main results in Table 2, Table 5, and Table 7. And we get similar results from the firm fixed effect models. 
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rights are 11 per cent, which indicates that the pyramid ownership structure is widely adopted by 
listed non-SOEs in the Chinese capital market.  
    Panel B presents the uni-variate tests for the main dependent variables of firms with and without 
excess control rights; firms with excess control rights have significantly higher excess leverage and 
more inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders, and less capital expenditure than firms without 
excess control rights. 
    In Panel C we present the DID tests for inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders of firms 
with high/low excess leverage, and with and without excess control rights. This panel also shows that 
firms with high excess leverage have significantly more inter-corporate loans than firms with lower 
excess leverage, although this is only found in firms with excess control rights. This supports our 
expectation that under China’s weak creditor protection system controlling shareholders with more 
excess control rights usually have an incentive to use high excess leverage to expand their control of 
resources in order to tunnel. . In countries with weak shareholder/creditor protection, the private 
benefit of expropriation enjoyed by controlling shareholders’ through a high leverage is greater than 
the costs of high leverage. Such net gains will either disappear or become very small in firms where 
the controlling shareholders have no excess control rights.  
    In panel D we present the DID tests of the excess leverage, inter-corporate loans to controlling 
shareholders, and CARs around the announcement of RPTs pre and post the NTS reform period. As 
expected, excess leverage and inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders decrease significantly 
after NTS reform, while CARs increase significantly in firms with excess control rights. These 
changes are significant when the change in firms without excess control rights is controlled. This 
suggests that NTS reform significantly reduces firms’ excess leverage and controlling shareholders’ 
tunneling, which supports our hypothesis H3a, H3b and H4.  
    Overall, the results of the uni-variate tests indicate that excess control rights and high excess 
leverage are always associated with more tunneling from controlling shareholders, whereas excess 
leverage and controlling shareholders’ tunneling decrease significantly in firms with excess control 
rights. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Analysis. 
Panel A. Summary statistics. This panel presents the number of observations (Obs.), Mean, Median, Standard deviation 
(STD), Minimum (Min) and Maximum (Max) for all variables used in the paper. Definitions of all the variables are reported 
in Appendix A. 
Var. Obs. MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX 
EX_BLEV (%) 1797  3.62  4.34  17.41  -46.80  75.36  
EX_MLEV (%) 1797  9.00  6.72  16.97  -30.68  76.18  
ORECTA (%) 1797  3.52  1.63  4.91  0.00  39.16  
CAPEXTA (%) 1797  10.84  6.80  22.02  -4.74  529.87  
CAR [-1, +1] (%) 770  0.84  0.46  5.54  -22.85  23.15  
CAR [-2, +2] (%) 770  0.48  0.14  9.85  -40.67  42.65  
CAR [-5, +5] (%) 770  0.63  0.38  7.47  -46.58  36.46  
CAR [MONTH 0] (%) 770  0.98  0.83  43.35  -143.58  122.41  
Q  1797  1.95  1.52  1.36  0.55  12.85  
SR  1797  0.08  -0.03  0.79  -1.86  9.93  
ROA  1797 0.04  0.03  0.06  -0.64  0.46  
ROE  1797  0.05  0.07  0.48  -16.77  2.92  
EXCESS 1797  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.00  0.41  
SDUMMY 1797  0.83  1.00  0.37  0.00  1.00  
CASHFLOW 1797  0.21  0.18  0.14  0.00  0.92  
TANG 1797  0.38  0.37  0.20  -0.00  0.98  
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SIZE (10 Million RMB) 1797  288.00  151.00  468.00  18.20  7300.00  
ROA 1797  0.04  0.03  0.06  -0.64  0.46  
GROW 1797  0.47  0.06  8.87  -1.00  400.68  
TAX 1797  0.01  0.01  0.01  -0.05  0.12  
MANAGER 1797  0.01  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.64  
BOARDSIZE 1797  9.08  9.00  2.03  3.00  20.00  
BOARDIN 1797  0.37  0.33  0.06  0.11  1.00  
 
Panel B. Univariate test of firms with and without excess control rights. This panel presents the univariate test for firms’ 
excess leverage and controlling shareholders’ tunneling of firms with and without excess control rights. ‘Excess’ refers to 
firms with excess control right and ‘Non-Excess’ represents firms without excess control right. ‘Difference Tests’ columns 
reports both t value for T-test and z value for Wilcoxon test of difference in mean and median.  
Non-excess (%) Excess (%) Difference Tests 
Obs. 302  1495  
Mean Median Mean Median T value Z value 
EX_BLEV 0.09 3.30 4.33 4.62 3.87*** 3.09*** 
EX_MLEV  6.95 5.63 9.41 6.93 2.29** 1.90* 
ORECTA  2.23 1.10 3.78 1.86 5.05*** 6.06*** 
CAPEXTA 13.90 10.13 10.22 6.26 2.65*** 7.13*** 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel C. Difference in difference test of inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders of firms with different ownership 
structure and firms with high and low excess leverage. This panel presents the univariate test for inter-corporate loans to 
controlling shareholders (ORECTA) of firms with high and low levels of excess leverage. ‘Excess’ refers to firms with 
excess control right and ‘Non-Excess’ represents firms without excess control right. ‘Low EX_BLEV’ refers to firms with 
low excess leverage and ‘High EX_BLEV’ represents firms with high excess leverage. ‘Difference Tests’ columns reports 
both t value for T-test and z value for Wilcoxon test of difference in mean and median.  
 Low EX_BLEV (%) High EX_BLEV (%) Difference (%) 
Obs Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Excess 1495 3.53 1.45 4.01 2.11 0.48* 0.66*** 
Non-excess 302 2.19 1.12 2.26 1.09 0.07 -0.03 
Difference -1.33*** -0.33*** -1.75*** -1.02*** -0.42*** 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel D. Difference in difference test for main dependent variables before and after NTS reform. This panel presents the 
univariate test for the main dependent variables before and after NTS reform. ‘Excess’ refers to firms with excess control 
rights and ‘Non-Excess’ represents firms without excess control rights. ‘Difference Tests’ columns reports both t value for 
T-test and z value for Wilcoxon test of difference in mean and median.  
Before NTS reform (%) After NTS reform (%) Differences (%) 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
EX_BLEV 
Excess  4.66 5.26 4.10 4.31 -0.56 -0.95 
No-Excess -1.02 1.22 0.90 4.52 1.92 3.30 
Differences -5.68*** -4.04*** -3.20** 0.21 2.48* 
EX_MLEV 
Excess  15.75 14.15 5.10 2.05 -10.65*** -12.10*** 
No-Excess 5.81 8.93 4.15 0.05 -1.66 -8.88*** 
Differences -9.94*** -5.22*** -0.95 -2.00 8.99*** 
ORECTA 
Excess  4.62 2.33 3.21 1.52 -1.41*** -0.81*** 
No-Excess 2.74 1.25 2.25 1.01 -0.49 -0.24 
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Differences -1.88*** -1.08*** -0.96*** -0.51*** 0.92*** 
CAR [-1,+1] 
Excess  0.02 0.49 1.32 0.45 1.30*** -0.04 
No-Excess 2.37 0.81 0.66 -0.05 -1.71 -0.86 
Differences 2.35** 0.32 -0.66 -0.50 -3.01*** 
CAR [-2,+2] 
Excess  -1.60 -0.27 1.13 0.19 2.73*** 0.46** 
No-Excess 3.58 1.44 1.76 1.99 -1.82 0.55 
Differences 5.18*** 1.71*** 0.63 1.80 -4.55*** 
CAR [-5,+5] 
Excess  -1.60 -0.03 1.13 0.78 2.73*** 0.81* 
No-Excess 3.37 0.31 0.88 0.26 -2.49 -0.05 
Differences 4.97 0.34 -0.25 -0.52 -5.22*** 
CAR [Month 
0] 
Excess  -3.78 -0.12 2.96 14.51 6.74** 14.63** 
No-Excess 0.88 1.31 3.99 16.95 3.11 15.64 
Differences 4.66* 1.43 -2.03 2.44 -3.63* 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.2 Excess control rights and firms’ leverage policy 
    Table 2 presents the results of the regression regarding the effect of excess control rights on excess 
leverage, using both the book and market value based excess leverage ratios as dependent variables.  
    As with evidence from the uni-variate tests, the coefficients of our measures of excess control 
rights are consistently positive and statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. We also 
obtain similar results after controlling  for the firm fixed effect, which indicates the robustness of our 
results, and also that the controlling shareholder of firms with excess control rights tends to adopt high 
excess leverage policy, which is consistent with Faccio et al. (2010), and supports our hypothesis H1. 
    From the other explanatory variables we find that most have statistically significant explanatory 
power. The controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights are included in the regression to account for 
their expected positive “incentive” effects on firm performance, as in Claessens et al. (2002) and Joh 
et al. (2003). Here we find that the controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights have a negative 
relationship with firm’s excess leverage, which indicates that controlling shareholders are less likely 
to tunnel through excess leverage when the cash flow rights are high, and furthermore, larger firms 
have more excess leverage. These results support the view that firm size serves as an inverse proxy 
for unobservable credit risk, which implies that larger firms should be more highly leveraged. As 
predicted by the pecking order theory, higher profitability is associated with a lower excess leverage. 
We also find that a higher effective tax rate is associated with a lower excess leverage, which is 
inconsistent with trade-off theory which argues that firms with higher tax rates should borrow more to 
utilize the tax shield effect. This result indicates that the tax advantages of debt capital are not 
attractive to firms in China, which is consistent with Booth et al. (2001).  
    Furthermore, we show that board size has a statistically significantly positive effect on debt level, 
which is consistent with Linck et al. (2008) who indicate that firms with a larger size board have 
higher leverage. However, there is no statistically significant relationship between board 
independence and firm’s debt level, which indicates that under the weak investor protection in 
countries like China, monitoring by independent directors is usually ineffective (La-Porta et al., 
2000). 
 
Table 2 
The effect of excess control right on leverage ratio. This Table presents the regression results on the effect of excess control 
right on firms’ excess leverage. Definitions of variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var OLS regression Firm fixed effect regression 
EX_BLEV EX_MLEV EX_BLEV EX_MLEV 
EXCESS 0.25***  0.12***  0.26***  0.29***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY 0.03***  0.01*  0.03**  -0.00  
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0.00  0.07  0.03  0.88  
CASHFLOW -0.04  -0.00*  -0.05***  -0.07***  -0.08**  -0.07*  -0.13***  -0.08*  
0.16  0.10  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.06  0.00  0.09  
TANG 0.05**  0.05***  0.02  0.01  0.07***  0.07***  0.01  0.02  
0.02  0.01  0.29  0.37  0.01  0.01  0.70  0.63  
SIZE 0.07***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.04***  0.04***  0.03***  0.03***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
ROA -0.90***  -0.91***  -0.95***  -0.96***  -0.48***  -0.48***  -0.72***  -0.72***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.32  0.43  0.51  0.60  0.10  0.14  0.11  0.15  
TAX -0.76**  -0.69**  -1.01***  -0.98***  0.00  -0.01  -1.84***  -1.83***  
0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.98  0.00  0.00  
MANAGER 0.08  0.07  0.09  0.08  -0.07  -0.08  -0.04  -0.04  
0.40  0.51  0.23  0.29  0.36  0.33  0.72  0.67  
BOARDSIZE 0.01***  0.01***  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.00  0.01  0.24  0.30  0.93  0.96  0.15  0.18  
BOARDIN -0.05  -0.06  0.04  0.04  -0.09*  -0.09**  -0.08  -0.09  
0.42  0.37  0.35  0.38  0.07  0.05  0.20  0.16  
_cons -1.44***  -1.49***  -1.76***  -1.79***  -0.74***  -0.73***  0.71***  0.73***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  
R2 0.27  0.26  0.56  0.55  0.16  0.14  0.11  0.09  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.3 Tunneling or investing: How controlling shareholders use the resources obtained through excess 
leverage  
    Whereas excess control rights do have a positive impact on excess leverage, it is still not clear 
whether controlling shareholders really use the resources for tunneling or investing in positive NPV 
projects. In the following two subsections we attempt to distinguish the effect of tunneling or 
investing by examining how the interaction of excess leverage and excess control rights affects inter-
corporate loans and capital expenditure11. If tunneling (investing) is the incentive that drives the 
excess control rights-leverage relationship, there should be a positive relationship between the 
interactive terms between excess control rights and excess leverage and inter-corporate loans (capital 
expenditure). 
4.3.1 The effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on controlling shareholders’ tunneling 
    Table 3 presents the results of the effect of excess control rights and high excess leverage on inter-
corporate loans to controlling shareholders. The results in columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 show that firms 
with excess control rights also have more inter-corporate loans with controlling shareholders. More 
importantly, the estimated coefficients of the interactive terms between excess control rights and high 
excess leverage dummies are consistently statistically significantly positive, which supports our 
expectation that controlling shareholders of firms with more excess control rights do use high excess 
leverage to facilitate tunneling. This supports our hypothesis H2a.  
 
                                                          
11 As indicated by Chen et al. (2009), capital expenditure is a proxy for firms’ investment opportunities.  
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Table 3 
The effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on inter-corporate loans. This Table presents the results of regressions 
on the effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders, which is the 
direct method that controlling shareholder use to tunnel.  HEX_BLEV is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the 
firm’s EX_BLEV is higher than median level and 0 otherwise; HEX_MLEV is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 
if the firm’s EX_MLEV is higher than median level, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 
A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.10***  0.06***  0.07***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY 0.01***  0.01**  0.01***  
0.00  0.02  0.00  
HEX_BLEV -0.01*  -0.00  
0.09  0.84  
HEX_MLEV -0.01**  0.00  
0.02  0.43  
HEX_BLEV*EXCESS 0.07***  
0.00  
HEX_BLEV*SDUMMY 0.00  
0.45  
HEX_MLEV*EXCESS 0.07***  
0.00  
HEX_MLEV*SDUMMY -0.01  
0.32  
CASHFLOW -0.01  -0.02***  -0.01  -0.02***  -0.01  -0.02***  
0.44  0.01  0.46  0.01  0.47  0.01  
TANG -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  -0.03***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
SIZE -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.15  0.62  0.13  0.43  0.23  0.74  
ROA -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.10***  -0.11***  -0.11***  -0.11***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.69  0.51  0.61  0.52  0.63  0.50  
TAX -0.29***  -0.26***  -0.27***  -0.26***  -0.28***  -0.27***  
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  
MANAGER -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  -0.01  
0.91  0.71  0.96  0.74  0.96  0.68  
BOARDSIZE -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  
0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  
BOARDIN 0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  
0.97  0.93  0.98  0.93  0.97  0.93  
_cons 0.09***  0.07**  0.10***  0.08***  0.09***  0.07**  
0.00  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.04  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  
R2 0.14  0.12  0.15  0.12  0.15  0.12  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.3.2 The effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on capital expenditure 
    Firms with more excess control rights and excess leverage are more likely to be tunneled by 
controlling shareholders, but they may also invest more in new positive NPV projects. To address this 
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concern we conduct new regressions to investigate whether firms with more excess control rights and 
high excess leverage invest more. The results are reported in Table 4. 
    We show from Table 4 that the coefficients of both excess control rights and the interactive terms 
between excess control rights and high excess leverage are consistently negative and statistically 
significant, which indicates that the excess leverage in firms with more excess control rights is not 
used to invest in new positive NPV projects. Thus our alternative hypothesis H2b cannot be upheld12. 
 
Table 4 
The effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on capital expenditure. This Table presents the results of regressions 
on the effect of excess control rights and excess leverage on capital expenditure. Independent variable is total capital 
expenditure to total assets. HEX_BLEV is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s EX_BLEV is higher 
than median level and 0 otherwise; HEX_MLEV is defined as a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm’s EX_MLEV is 
higher than median level, and 0 otherwise. Definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in 
italics.  
Var CAPEXTA 
EXCESS -0.04  0.13  0.06  
0.55  0.14  0.45  
SDUMMY -0.03**  -0.02  -0.02  
0.04  0.37  0.26  
HEX_BLEV -0.01  -0.02  
0.61  0.44  
HEX_MLEV 0.01  0.00  
0.77  1.00  
HEX_BLEV*EXCESS -0.27***  
0.01  
HEX_BLEV*SDUMMY -0.02  
0.40  
HEX_MLEV*EXCESS -0.19*  
0.08  
HEX_MLEV*SDUMMY -0.02  
0.48  
CASHFLOW -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  
0.61  0.42  0.66  0.44  0.55  0.35  
TANG -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.02  -0.03  
0.42  0.41  0.41  0.34  0.43  0.39  
SIZE -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  
0.15  0.15  0.67  0.74  0.41  0.42  
ROA 0.27***  0.27***  0.20**  0.20**  0.24**  0.24**  
0.01  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.02  
GROW -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.74  0.77  0.79  0.74  0.76  0.75  
TAX 0.65  0.63  0.50  0.54  0.55  0.57  
0.14  0.16  0.26  0.23  0.22  0.21  
MANAGER 0.04  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.05  0.02  
0.78  0.90  0.81  0.93  0.75  0.89  
BOARDSIZE -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  
0.02  0.02  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.03  
BOARDIN -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  
0.79  0.77  0.87  0.80  0.81  0.80  
                                                          
12 We also conduct firm fixed effect regressions for the results reported in Table 3 and 4, and obtain similar results. 
However, the results of the firm fixed effect are not reported due to limited space. 
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_cons 0.83***  0.86***  0.71***  0.73***  0.76***  0.78***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  
R2 0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.4 The effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on firms’ excess leverage and controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling 
    Another intuitive way to examine whether controlling shareholders adopt excess leverage policy in 
order to tunnel is to see whether a firms’ leverage policy changes when their incentive to tunnel 
decreases after NTS reform. We conduct several new regressions that consider the effect of NTS 
reform and excess control rights on both leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ tunneling.  
4.4.1 The effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on excess leverage 
    Table 5 presents the results of NTS reform on the relationship between excess control rights and 
excess leverage. Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficients of the interaction between excess 
control rights and the NTS reform dummy are consistently negative, and are significant in both 
economic magnitude and statistical significance. Specifically, we suggest that a 1% increase of excess 
control rights results in an increase of 0.33% in book value based excess leverage before NTS reform 
and an increase of only 0.17% (the sum of 0.33% and -0.16%) after the reform. This result supports 
our hypothesis H3a. 
 
Table 5 
The effect of excess control right and NTS reform on excess leverage. This Table presents the results of regressions on the 
effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on firms’ excess leverage. Definitions of variables are reported in Appendix 
A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var OLS regression Firm fixed effect 
EX_BLEV EX_MLEV EX_LEV EX_MLEV 
EXCESS 0.33***  0.18***  0.55***  0.38***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
SDUMMY 0.04***  0.03**  0.07  0.05  
0.01  0.02  0.13  0.16  
REFORM 0.01  0.01  0.02*  0.03*  0.06  0.05  -0.06*  -0.06  
0.53  0.75  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.38  0.06  0.12  
EXCESS*REFORM -0.16**  -0.11*  -0.54**  -0.45**  
0.04  0.07  0.05  0.03  
SDUMMY*REFORM -0.02  -0.02  -0.06  -0.05  
0.36  0.13  0.35  0.27  
CASHFLOW 0.04  0.00  -0.05***  -0.07***  0.06  0.02  -0.01  -0.03  
0.16  0.93  0.01  0.00  0.31  0.68  0.75  0.46  
TANG 0.05**  0.05***  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.07*  0.03  0.03  
0.03  0.01  0.27  0.37  0.14  0.10  0.27  0.35  
SIZE 0.07***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.08***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
ROA -0.87***  -0.88***  -0.94***  -0.95***  -1.28***  -1.31***  -1.30***  -1.33***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
16 
 
0.29  0.43  0.50  0.62  0.91  0.78  0.65  0.54  
TAX -0.77***  -0.72**  -1.01***  -0.99***  -0.96  -0.87  -0.53  -0.49  
0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.22  0.27  0.36  0.40  
MANAGER 0.07  0.06  0.08  0.07  0.30  0.29  0.10  0.10  
0.49  0.54  0.31  0.38  0.32  0.34  0.66  0.66  
BOARDSIZE 0.01***  0.01***  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.00  0.00  0.18  0.24  0.20  0.25  0.72  0.79  
BOARDIN -0.05  -0.06  0.04  0.04  -0.14  -0.15  0.02  0.02  
0.42  0.36  0.35  0.40  0.39  0.38  0.87  0.89  
_cons -1.50***  -1.51***  -1.79***  -1.64***  -1.62***  -1.66***  -1.64***  -1.65***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  
R2 0.27  0.26  0.56  0.55  0.13  0.25  0.42  0.42  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.4.2 Control for market timing 
    Market timing theory indicates that firms may issue new shares when their market valuation is high 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Alti, 2006). Welch (2004) also finds that stock returns can explain about 
40% of capital structure dynamics. Given that immediately after NTS reform the Chinese capital 
market peaked in 2007, the ensuing decrease in leverage of firms with excess control rights may also 
be caused by market timing, so after controlling with market timing we conduct a new regression by 
examining the effect of excess control rights on the difference in excess leverage between prior and 
post NTS reform.  According to previous studies, this study uses the difference of market to book 
ratio (∆ MTB) and the difference of market-adjusted share return (∆ SR) between prior and post NTS 
reform, to address the effects from market timing. The results are reported in columns 1 to 4 and 
columns 5 to 8 of Table 6.  
    The results in Table 6 are consistent with our expectations and the results in Table 5. We first find 
that ∆ MTB and ∆ SR are both statistically significantly negatively associated to changes in market 
value based excess leverage, which implies that the increase in market valuation after NTS reform do 
decrease firms’ excess leverage. This shows that although the effect of market timing does exist in the 
Chinese capital market, the excess leverage of firms with excess control rights did decrease 
significantly after NTS reform, even when the effect of market timing has been controlled. Therefore, 
our results in Table 6 suggest that although the decrease of excess leverage after NTS reform can be 
partially explained by market timing, excess control rights have incremental power in explaining the 
change in firms’ excess leverage after NTS reform. 
 
Table 6 
The effect of excess control on change of excess leverage after NTS reform (control for market timing). This Table presents 
the results of regressions on the effect of excess control rights on change of excess leverage after the NTS reform with 
control for market timing. The dependent variables are ∆ EX_BLEV and ∆ EX_MLEV. ∆ EX_BLEV is defined as the 
average post-NTS reform book value based excess leverage minus the average pre-NTS reform book value based excess 
leverage. While ∆ EX_MLEV is defined as the average post-NTS reform market value based excess leverage minus the 
average pre-NTS reform market value based excess leverage. Please note we are using the post-NTS reform excess leverage 
minus pre-NTS excess leverage to measure changes in excess leverage, a negative result means a decrease and a positive 
result means increase. ∆ MTB and ∆ SR are two measures of market timing. Definitions of variables are reported in 
Appendix A. Please note the number of observations reduce from 2215 to 314 because one specific firm just have one 
change observation. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var ∆ EX_LEV ∆ EX_MLEV ∆ EX_LEV ∆ EX_MLEV 
∆ MTB -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  -0.00***  
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  
∆ SR 0.01  0.01  -0.03***  -0.03***  
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0.42  0.47  0.00  0.00  
EXCESS -0.27***  -0.22***  -0.28***  -0.23***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY -0.06***  -0.07***  -0.06***  -0.08***  
0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  
CASHFLOW 0.12**  0.15***  0.13***  0.14***  0.12**  0.15***  0.12***  0.13***  
0.04  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01  
TANG 0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.04  
0.91  0.81  0.39  0.38  1.00  0.90  0.35  0.34  
SIZE -0.01  -0.01  -0.04***  -0.04***  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03***  -0.03***  
0.19  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.31  0.21  0.00  0.00  
ROA -0.18  -0.23  0.39***  0.33**  -0.15  -0.20  0.37***  0.30**  
0.29  0.19  0.01  0.02  0.39  0.27  0.01  0.04  
GROW -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  
0.23  0.24  0.32  0.34  0.27  0.27  0.48  0.50  
TAX 0.63  0.66  0.90  0.91  0.56  0.59  0.60  0.61  
0.38  0.36  0.14  0.13  0.44  0.43  0.34  0.32  
MANAGER -6.11  -4.96  -18.40  -16.14  -5.70  -4.53  -17.70  -15.33  
0.71  0.76  0.18  0.24  0.73  0.79  0.21  0.27  
BOARDSIZE 0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.49  0.45  0.88  0.95  0.38  0.34  0.85  0.78  
BOARDIN -0.37**  -0.34**  -0.30**  -0.27**  -0.38**  -0.34**  -0.27**  -0.24*  
0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.05  0.07  
_cons 0.23  0.24  0.78***  0.81***  0.18  0.19  0.69***  0.72***  
0.33  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.45  0.43  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 314  314  314  314  314  314  314  314  
R2 0.08  0.07  0.22  0.23  0.06  0.05  0.19  0.21  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.4.3 The effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on inter-corporate loans to controlling 
shareholders 
    Table 7 presents the effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on inter-corporate loans, which 
is a major tool used by controlling shareholders for tunneling (Jiang et al., 2010).  
    Table 7 also shows that the interaction between excess control rights and NTS reform is statistically 
significantly negatively related to inter-corporate loans, either in our OLS model or the firm fixed 
effect model. Likewise, a 1% increase of excess control rights resulted in an increase of 0.14% in 
inter-corporate loans before NTS reform and an increase of only 0.07% (the sum of 0.14% and -
0.07%) afterwards, that is, the controlling shareholder’s tunneling activities in firms with high excess 
control rights drops significantly after NTS reform. This result supports our hypothesis H3b.   
 
Table 7 
The effect of excess control right and NTS reform on inter-corporate loans. This Table presents the results of regressions on 
the effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on inter-corporate loans to controlling shareholders. Definitions of 
variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var ORECTA 
OLS regression Firm fixed effect 
EXCESS 0.14*** 0.22***  
0.00 0.00  
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SDUMMY 0.01*** 0.04*** 
0.00 0.00  
REFORM 0.00 0.00 -0.01  -0.01  
0.99 0.59 0.45  0.59  
EXCESS*REFORM -0.07*** -0.23***  
0.00 0.00  
SDUMMY*REFORM -0.01 -0.03*  
0.40 0.06  
CASHFLOW -0.01 -0.02*** -0.00  -0.01  
0.52 0.01 0.90  0.56  
TANG -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***  -0.03***  
0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01  
SIZE 0.00 0.00 -0.00  -0.00  
0.16 0.61 0.32  0.52  
ROA -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.23***  -0.24***  
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00 0.00 -0.00  -0.00  
0.76 0.52 0.92  0.75  
TAX -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.29  -0.26  
0.00 0.01 0.21  0.26  
MANAGER -0.01 -0.01 0.03  0.03  
0.74 0.68 0.75  0.73  
BOARDSIZE 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00  -0.00  
0.01 0.00 0.50  0.40  
BOARDIN 0.00 0.00 0.02  0.02  
0.94 0.93 0.69  0.75  
_cons 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*  0.08  
0.00 0.00 0.08  0.15  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797 1797 1797  1797  
R2 0.15 0.12 0.12  0.10  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.4.4 Evidence from the capital market  
    The positive relationship between excess control rights and excess leverage has been weakened 
significantly by NTS reform, suggesting that controlling shareholders used less (more) value-
destroying (value-enhancing) RPTs after  the reform than before, but to provide direct evidence for 
these expectations, we also examine how the capital market reacts to firms’ announcement of RPTs 
before and after NTS reform. As discussed above, this study adopts 3 days, 5 days, and 11 days 
market adjusted CARs as short abnormal returns. Long-horizon abnormal returns (CAR [MONTH 0]) 
are calculated based on four different benchmarks, as indicated by Cheung et al. (2006), but to 
economize, we focus on the size and market to book ratio benchmark. The results based on the 
remaining approaches for estimating abnormal returns are qualitatively similar. 
    We then conduct new regressions to examine whether the value-destroying (value-enhancing) RPTs 
decrease (increase) after NTS reform. We first conduct a logistic regression where the dependent 
variable is positive CAR dummy variables, to examine whether controlling shareholders are more 
(less) likely to adopt value-enhancing (value-destroying) RPTs after NTS reform when they have 
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excess control rights. We then conduct a multi-regression model where continuous CARs are used as 
dependent variables to examine how minority shareholders react to the RPT announcement pre and 
post NTS reform period. The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9 respectively. 
    Table 8 shows that firms with excess control rights are less likely to have value-adding related 
party transactions with their controlling shareholders, which indicates that the interactive terms 
between excess control rights and NTS reform are significantly positively associated to the probability 
of a positive CAR. This implies that the probability of adopting value-adding RPTs in firms with 
excess control rights increases significantly after NTS reform. 
 
Table 8 
The effect of excess control right and NTS reform on probability of value added related party transaction. This Table 
presents the results of regressions on the effect of excess control right and NTS reform and their interaction on probability of 
value-enhancing related party transactions with controlling shareholders (probability of positive market reaction). The 
dependent variables are positive CAR dummies that equal to 1 if the announcement of related party transaction is associated 
to positive CARs. CARs include 3 days, 5 days and 11 days cumulative abnormal returns and size and market to book ratio 
adjusted abnormal returns for the month of the announcement of related party transactions. Definitions of all independent 
variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var POSITIVE CAR DUMMY 
CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-5,+5] CAR [MONTH 0] 
EXCESS -6.32***  -2.47*  -3.16**  -3.95**  
0.00  0.10  0.04  0.02  
SDUMMY -0.92**  0.22  -0.20  -0.37  
0.04  0.59  0.64  0.39  
REFORM -1.04***  -0.81  -0.01  0.30  -0.78  -0.78  0.84*  1.27**  
0.01  0.17  0.97  0.59  0.07  0.19  0.08  0.04  
EXCESS*REFORM 6.77***  1.65**  2.05**  8.03***  
0.00  0.04  0.03  0.00  
SDUMMY*REFORM 0.70*  -0.06  0.34  0.57  
0.10  0.91  0.52  0.29  
CASHFLOW 0.31  0.46  0.54  0.96*  -0.07  0.33  -0.80  -0.95  
0.60  0.42  0.35  0.08  0.91  0.55  0.21  0.12  
SIZE -0.20**  -0.16*  -0.12  -0.09  -0.04  -0.01  -0.34***  -0.32***  
0.04  0.07  0.20  0.34  0.65  0.93  0.00  0.00  
ROA -0.05  -0.08  1.91  1.88  1.68  1.59  0.28  0.32  
0.97  0.96  0.19  0.19  0.25  0.27  0.86  0.84  
GROW -0.07  -0.09  -0.05  -0.06  -0.07  -0.09  -0.03  -0.03  
0.37  0.23  0.36  0.33  0.32  0.24  0.41  0.32  
MANAGER 5.39*  4.64  -2.09  -1.90  -3.01  -2.79  8.64**  7.85**  
0.09  0.15  0.42  0.47  0.26  0.30  0.03  0.04  
BOARDSIZE -0.03  -0.03  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  
0.54  0.51  0.59  0.61  0.71  0.72  0.96  0.85  
BOARDIN -1.55  -1.52  0.44  0.40  -0.79  -0.86  -1.77  -1.90  
0.23  0.24  0.73  0.75  0.53  0.50  0.21  0.17  
_cons -2.01  -1.25  -2.37  -2.31  1.34  1.78  5.18**  4.83**  
0.35  0.56  0.26  0.27  0.53  0.41  0.03  0.04  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 770  770  770  770  770  770  770  770  
Pseudo R2 0.05  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.17  0.16  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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    Table 9 also shows that controlling shareholders’ excess control rights have a statistically 
significantly negative impact on CAR, indicating that the market responded negatively when firms 
whose controlling shareholder has excess control rights announce an RPT with their controlling 
shareholders. Moreover, since the coefficients of interactive variables of excess control rights and 
NTS reform are consistently positive and statistically significant, we can conclude that investors in 
firms with excess control rights valued the related party transactions more after NTS reform.  
    Overall, our hypothesis H4 is also supported by our empirical results in Tables 8 and 9. 
 
Table 9 
The effect of excess control right and NTS reform on market reaction around the announcement of related party transactions. 
This Table presents the results of regressions on the effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on market reaction 
around the announcement of related party transactions. The dependent variables are market reaction (CARs) around the 
announcement of related party transactions with controlling shareholders (3 days, 5 days 11 days market adjusted cumulative 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the month of the announcement of related party transactions). 
Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var CARs  
CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-5,+5] CAR [MONTH 0] 
EXCESS -0.55***  -0.29***  -0.13***  -1.19***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY -0.08***  -0.03**  -0.02  -0.10  
0.00  0.05  0.11  0.19  
REFORM -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.03*  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02  0.10  0.28***  
0.00  0.01  0.08  0.42  0.13  0.19  0.21  0.01  
EXCESS*REFORM 0.53***  0.26***  0.11**  1.76***  
0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  
SDUMMY*REFORM 0.08***  0.03*  0.02  0.05  
0.00  0.10  0.13  0.60  
CASHFLOW 0.02  0.05**  0.02  0.04*  0.01  0.02  0.23**  0.25**  
0.35  0.05  0.40  0.06  0.69  0.25  0.03  0.02  
SIZE 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01**  0.00  0.00  -0.06***  -0.06***  
0.37  0.98  0.25  0.05  0.65  0.33  0.00  0.00  
ROA 0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.02  0.04  
0.37  0.46  0.27  0.32  0.26  0.30  0.95  0.89  
GROW 0.00  0.00*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.17  0.09  0.29  0.21  0.25  0.23  0.91  0.57  
MANAGER 0.14  0.10  -0.08  -0.10  -0.07  -0.06  1.30***  1.01**  
0.26  0.41  0.36  0.31  0.33  0.35  0.01  0.05  
BOARDSIZE 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.99  0.93  0.72  0.75  0.96  0.96  0.74  0.63  
BOARDIN 0.03  0.03  0.08  0.07*  0.05  0.05  -0.24  -0.23  
0.59  0.64  0.08  0.10  0.13  0.15  0.32  0.35  
_cons -0.03  0.04  0.15  0.18*  0.08  0.10  1.10**  1.03*  
0.81  0.75  0.13  0.07  0.29  0.18  0.04  0.06  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 770  770  770  770  770  770  770  770  
R2 0.09  0.03  0.05  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.19  0.17  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
21 
 
4.5 Factors influencing the relationship between excess control rights, NTS reform and firms’ 
leverage policy 
    In this subsection we investigate the factors that influence the relationship between excess control 
rights, NTS reform, and firms’ leverage policy. We aim to shed light on the situation where the 
relationship between excess control rights, NTS reform, and firms’ leverage policy is strengthened or 
weakened in firms that have or have not taken part in RPTs, and firms with high or low bank 
monitoring.  
4.5.1 Participation of related party transactions 
    We use the market reaction around the announcement of RPTs as a proxy for tunneling. This may 
cause a an issue with self selection because firms can choose to announce RPTs, so we investigate 
whether the effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on excess leverage is strengthened or 
weakened in firms with and without participating RPTs.  To address this issue we divided our sample 
into two sub-samples where a firm has or has not taken part in RPTs, and then conduct our regression 
equation (2) using the two separate sub-samples. We believe that the negative effect of excess control 
rights and NTS reform on leverage should be weak in firms without any RPT because this means that 
controlling shareholders would not tunnel.  The empirical results are presented in Table 10. 
    This table shows that the interactive terms of excess control rights and NTS reform are significantly 
negatively associated with excess leverage of firms with RPT, but there is no significantly negatively 
relationship in the subsample of firms without RPT. Our findings in this table confirm our conjecture 
that any decrease of excess leverage after NTS reform only exists in firms that have RPTs. 
 
Table 10 
The effect of excess control and NTS reform on excess leverage of firms with and without related party transactions. This 
Table presents the regression results on the effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on excess leverage of firms that 
have taken part in related party transactions and firms that never have taken part in related party transactions. The dependent 
variables are EX_BLEV and EX_MLEV. Columns 1 to 4 (RPT=1) present the results of firms that have taken part in related 
party transactions; Columns 5 to 8 (RPT=0) present the results of firms that never have taken part in related party 
transactions. Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var RPT=1 RPT=0 
EX_LEV EX_MLEV EX_LEV EX_MLEV 
EXCESS 0.19***  0.10**  0.50***  0.28***  
0.01  0.05  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY 0.05***  0.02*  0.01  0.01  
0.01  0.09  0.63  0.46  
REFORM 0.03  0.04  0.03*  0.05**  -0.03  -0.05  -0.01  -0.02  
0.18  0.16  0.06  0.02  0.32  0.28  0.73  0.45  
EXCESS*REFORM -0.08**  -0.06**  -0.02  -0.16  
0.04  0.04  0.89  0.18  
SDUMMY*REFORM -0.02  -0.03  0.01  -0.00  
0.36  0.13  0.85  0.90  
CASHFLOW 0.02  0.00  -0.07***  -0.08***  0.12  0.00  0.01  -0.03  
0.54  0.91  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.96  0.76  0.55  
TANG 0.08***  0.09***  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.14***  0.14***  
0.00  0.00  0.21  0.15  0.38  0.23  0.00  0.00  
SIZE 0.06***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.07***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
ROA -1.10***  -1.09***  -1.23***  -1.23***  -0.67***  -0.71***  -0.63***  -0.64***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00**  0.00**  
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0.53  0.66  0.80  0.92  0.12  0.09  0.04  0.04  
TAX -0.42  -0.40  -0.59**  -0.57**  -0.79  -0.85  -1.20***  -1.19***  
0.27  0.28  0.04  0.05  0.21  0.19  0.01  0.01  
MANAGER 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.24  0.09  0.20  0.17  
0.71  0.73  0.59  0.73  0.41  0.76  0.34  0.41  
BOARDSIZE 0.01***  0.01***  0.00**  0.00**  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  
0.00  0.00  0.04  0.05  0.28  0.38  0.91  0.92  
BOARDIN -0.04  -0.05  0.05  0.05  -0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.01  
0.53  0.49  0.36  0.38  0.74  0.73  0.82  0.92  
_cons -1.10***  -1.22***  -1.34***  -1.55***  -1.46***  -1.34***  -1.58***  -1.54***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1357  1357  1357  1357  440  440  440  440  
R2 0.28  0.28  0.59  0.59  0.28  0.23  0.52  0.50  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.5.2 Strength of bank monitoring 
    Previous studies indicate that bank monitoring also plays an important role in controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling activities, especially in firms with high excess control rights (Lin et al., 
2011b; Lin et al., 2012). Moreover these studies indicate that China’s banking system is still 
dominated by state owned banks (Firth et al., 2008), who primarily issue loans to state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and still discriminate against non-SOEs(Li et al., 2009; Firth et al., 2009). Given 
the weak overall credit protection and discrimination against non-SOEs by state-owned banks in 
China, we expect state owned banks to have a strong incentive to monitor the tunneling activities of 
non-SOEs. The strength of bank monitoring may impact on our results because tunneling in firms 
with strong monitoring should be less prevalent than in firms where monitoring is weak.  Thus, we 
expect that the decrease of excess leverage of firms with excess control rights caused by the reform 
should be more pronounced in firms with weak bank monitoring. 
    This study adopts two proxies for the strength of bank monitoring. First, previous literature 
indicates that private Chinese firms need to build political connections to obtain resources from 
bureaucrats due to intense governmental intervention (Chen et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011), while 
private firms with political connections receive special treatment from banks which results in a lower 
level of bank monitoring (Firth et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009). We therefore use political connections 
as one proxy for the inversed strength of monitoring.  In addition, as banks can exercise their 
monitoring power more effectively through short term debt than long term debt (Jensen, 1986; 
DeAngelo et al., 2002), we expect that firms with higher levels of short term bank loans would be 
monitored more extensively, so we also use firms with a higher level of short term bank loans as 
another proxy, to provide robust evidence. Definitions for the classification variables are shown in 
Appendix A.  
    The results of excess control rights and NTS reform on firms’ leverage policy and firms with 
different degrees of monitoring are presented in Table 11, where panel A presents the results of using 
political connections as a proxy for monitoring, while panel B presents the results using the level of 
short term loans.  
    Panel A shows that the interactive terms of excess control rights and NTS reform only has a 
consistently negative and statistically significantly effect on the leverage policy of firms with political 
connections, whereas the statistically significantly negatively relationship between excess control 
rights, NTS reform, and leverage policy is only found in firms with lower levels of short term loans in 
panel B. Therefore, our findings in Table 11 show that the decrease in leverage of firms with high 
excess control rights is more pronounced in those with a lower level of monitoring.  
 
Table 11 
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The effect of excess control and NTS reform on excess leverage of firms with different bank monitoring. 
Panel A Firms with and without political connections. This panel presents the regression results on the effect of excess 
control rights and NTS reform on excess leverage of firms with and without political connections, which is a proxy for the 
strength of bank monitoring. The dependent variables are EX_BLEV and EX_MLEV. Columns 1 to 4 (PC=1) present the 
results of firms with political connections; Columns 5 to 8 (PC=0) present the results of firms without political connections. 
Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics. 
Var PC=1 PC=0 
EX_LEV EX_MLEV EX_LEV EX_MLEV 
EXCESS 0.55***  0.29***  0.12  0.09  
0.00  0.00  0.12  0.11  
SDUMMY 0.06**  0.02  0.03*  0.03**  
0.05  0.43  0.10  0.03  
REFORM 0.02  0.00  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03*  
0.61  1.00  0.47  0.50  0.92  0.72  0.20  0.08  
EXCESS*REFORM -0.22*  -0.26**  0.08  0.05  
0.10  0.02  0.42  0.47  
SDUMMY*REFORM -0.01  -0.04*  0.00  -0.01  
0.75  0.07  0.94  0.54  
CASHFLOW 0.03  -0.05  -0.12***  -0.16***  0.04  0.02  -0.02  -0.04  
0.62  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.23  0.51  0.38  0.14  
TANG 0.07*  0.08**  0.01  0.01  0.05**  0.05**  0.02  0.01  
0.07  0.04  0.79  0.84  0.05  0.05  0.41  0.45  
SIZE 0.06***  0.06***  0.08***  0.08***  0.07***  0.08***  0.08***  0.08***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
ROA -0.90***  -0.92***  -0.84***  -0.86***  -0.93***  -0.93***  -1.05***  -1.05***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.33  0.66  0.69  0.94  0.25  0.23  0.27  0.25  
TAX -0.12  -0.24  -0.66  -0.74*  -1.04***  -0.95**  -1.07***  -0.99***  
0.83  0.66  0.12  0.08  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  
MANAGER -0.20  -0.25  -0.00  -0.03  0.24**  0.24**  0.13  0.12  
0.27  0.18  0.98  0.86  0.05  0.05  0.16  0.19  
BOARDSIZE -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01***  0.01***  0.00**  0.00**  
0.98  0.68  0.76  0.53  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.04  
BOARDIN 0.16  0.18  0.12  0.11  -0.19***  -0.20***  -0.01  -0.02  
0.14  0.11  0.17  0.20  0.01  0.01  0.88  0.78  
_cons -1.22***  -1.19***  -1.68***  -1.50***  -1.63***  -1.67***  -1.75***  -1.78***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 625  625  625  625  1172  1172  1172  1172  
R2 0.27  0.24  0.56  0.55  0.29  0.28  0.56  0.56  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B Firms with low and high level of short-term bank loans. This panel presents the regression results on the effect of 
excess control rights and NTS reform on excess leverage of firms high and low level of short-term bank loans, which is 
another proxy for the strength of bank monitoring. The dependent variables are EX_BLEV and EX_MLEV. Columns 1 to 4 
(HSTB=1) present the results of firms higher level of short-term bank loans; Columns 5 to 8 (HSTB=0) present the results of 
firms with lower level of short-term bank loans. Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix A. P-
values are displayed in italics.  
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Var HSTB=0 HSTB=1 
EX_LEV EX_MLEV EX_LEV EX_MLEV 
EXCESS 0.37***  0.23***  0.22***  0.13**  
0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04  
SDUMMY 0.01  0.02  0.06***  0.03*  
0.60  0.18  0.00  0.06  
REFORM 0.02  -0.00  0.05**  0.05**  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  
0.49  0.90  0.02  0.04  0.56  0.93  0.77  0.95  
EXCESS*REFORM -0.13**  -0.20**  0.04  0.03  
0.03  0.02  0.73  0.69  
SDUMMY*REFORM 0.01  -0.03*  -0.02  -0.01  
0.74  0.10  0.49  0.78  
CASHFLOW 0.05  -0.01  -0.07**  -0.09***  0.02  -0.00  -0.04  -0.06**  
0.26  0.87  0.02  0.00  0.56  0.93  0.19  0.05  
TANG 0.00  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.12***  0.13***  0.01  0.00  
0.97  0.87  0.23  0.28  0.00  0.00  0.73  0.93  
SIZE 0.08***  0.08***  0.08***  0.08***  0.06***  0.06***  0.08***  0.09***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
ROA -1.00***  -1.03***  -1.06***  -1.07***  -0.80***  -0.80***  -0.88***  -0.88***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.18  0.14  0.19  0.14  0.30  0.43  0.69  0.82  
TAX -0.83*  -0.83*  -0.70  -0.74**  -0.69  -0.58  -1.25***  -1.19***  
0.10  0.10  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.15  0.00  0.00  
MANAGER 0.32**  0.29**  0.11  0.09  -0.17  -0.16  0.06  0.06  
0.03  0.05  0.30  0.38  0.25  0.27  0.63  0.62  
BOARDSIZE 0.01**  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00*  0.00*  0.00  0.00  
0.04  0.11  0.37  0.50  0.09  0.08  0.59  0.58  
BOARDIN 0.12  0.09  0.12*  0.11*  -0.25***  -0.25***  -0.04  -0.04  
0.17  0.30  0.06  0.08  0.00  0.01  0.55  0.60  
_cons -1.65***  -1.60***  -1.55***  -1.53***  -0.95***  -1.04***  -1.69***  -1.75***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 897  897  897  897  900  900  900  900  
R2 0.28  0.26  0.56  0.56  0.28  0.28  0.55  0.55  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
    Overall, our results in Table 10 and Table 11 suggest that the decrease of excess leverage in firms 
with excess control rights are more pronounced in firms associated with more tunneling from 
controlling shareholders, that is, firms that participate in related party transactions and firms with 
lower levels of monitoring. Our findings are also consistent with our expectations, indicating the 
robustness of our results in subsection 4.4. 
4.6 Additional tests 
4.6.1 The effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on firm performance 
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    To provide some additional evidence for our results, we conduct a new series of regressions that 
directly linked excess control rights and NTS reform to firm performance13. Using exogenous shock 
with NTS reform, we examined the effect that the controlling shareholder has on a firm’s performance 
without an endogeneity bias. The results are presented in Table 12. Panel A shows the interactive 
effect of excess control rights and NTS reform on firm performance, while panel B presents the effect 
of prior reforms’ excess control rights on changes in  firms  performance caused by these reforms 
(post-NTS reform performance minus pre-NTS reform performance). 
    As expected panel A shows that excess control rights have a negative impact on firm performance 
but the interactive terms between excess control rights and NTS reform have a positive impact. This 
indicates that the performance of firms with more excess control rights improves significantly after 
NTS reform. Similarly, panel B shows that firms with more excess control rights before NTS reform 
are also associated with better performance. This is also consistent with our expectations. 
 
Table 12 
Excess control right, NTS reform and firm performance 
Panel A The effect of excess control right and NTS reform on firm performance. This panel presents the regression results 
on the effect of excess control right and NTS reform on firm performance. The dependent variables are measure of firm 
performance. Definitions of all independent variables are reported in Appendix A. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var PERFORMANCE 
Q SR ROA ROE 
EXCESS -1.63***  0.00  -0.05*  -0.91***  
0.00  1.00  0.06  0.00  
SDUMMY -0.61***  0.02  -0.01**  -0.05  
0.00  0.83  0.04  0.33  
REFORM -0.07  -0.25  -0.23**  -0.38***  0.01*  0.01  0.02  0.07  
0.65  0.16  0.02  0.00  0.09  0.21  0.78  0.35  
EXCESS*REFORM 1.36**  0.19  0.06*  0.88***  
0.03  0.63  0.06  0.00  
SDUMMY*REFORM 0.38***  0.21**  0.01  0.05  
0.01  0.04  0.32  0.38  
CASHFLOW 0.07  0.00  0.17  0.22  0.04***  0.04***  0.05  0.15*  
0.77  0.99  0.26  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.55  0.08  
SIZE -0.37***  -0.37***  0.05**  0.05**  0.01***  0.01***  0.05***  0.04***  
0.00  0.00  0.03  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.94  0.79  0.39  0.38  0.20  0.17  0.89  0.73  
MANAGER 0.10  -0.05  -0.29  -0.05  0.10**  0.09**  0.13  0.13  
0.90  0.95  0.59  0.92  0.02  0.03  0.68  0.70  
BOARDSIZE -0.01  -0.00  0.02*  0.02*  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
0.62  0.75  0.06  0.07  0.32  0.27  0.96  0.80  
BOARDIN 1.35***  1.38***  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.03  -0.07  -0.04  
0.01  0.00  0.89  0.84  0.17  0.16  0.73  0.85  
_cons 9.82***  8.85***  -0.75  -1.24***  -0.23***  -0.21***  -1.25***  -1.13***  
0.00  0.00  0.15  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  1797  
                                                          
13 Following previous studies, this  study uses Tobin’ Q and yearly based market adjusted share return as proxies for market 
performance, and ROA, ROE as proxies for accounting performance, to ensure the  robustness of our results. 
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R2 0.22  0.23  0.59  0.59  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.03  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B The effect of excess control rights (before NTS reform) on performance change. This panel presents the regression 
results on the effect of excess control rights on change in firm performance after the NTS reform. The dependent variables 
are change of performance measures, which is defined as the average post-NTS reform firm performance minus the average 
pre-NTS firm performance. Definitions of variables are reported in Appendix A. Please note the number of observations 
reduce from 2215 to 314 because one specific firm just have one change observation. P-values are displayed in italics.  
Var ∆ Performance 
∆ Q ∆ SR ∆ ROA ∆ ROE 
EXCESS 1.79*  0.90*  0.11***  0.79***  
0.07  0.08  0.00  0.00  
SDUMMY 0.49**  0.06  0.01  0.03  
0.05  0.67  0.16  0.62  
CASHFLOW 0.66  0.55  -0.31  -0.50  0.03  0.01  0.15  -0.02  
0.29  0.37  0.34  0.12  0.29  0.73  0.40  0.91  
SIZE -0.39***  -0.37***  -0.03  -0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  
0.00  0.00  0.60  0.72  0.60  0.44  0.23  0.37  
GROW -0.15  -0.15  -0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.03  -0.02  
0.12  0.13  1.00  0.97  0.15  0.18  0.35  0.40  
MANAGER -15.72  -29.49  -13.33  -9.75  4.44  4.50  38.89  42.80  
0.93  0.87  0.89  0.92  0.52  0.52  0.43  0.39  
BOARDSIZE -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  
0.91  0.88  0.75  0.73  0.46  0.49  0.23  0.21  
BOARDIN -0.50  -0.69  0.61  0.49  -0.04  -0.05  -0.08  -0.19  
0.77  0.69  0.50  0.59  0.58  0.45  0.87  0.70  
_cons 8.60***  8.41***  -0.20  -0.12  -0.09  -0.08  0.56  0.65  
0.00  0.00  0.88  0.93  0.38  0.41  0.42  0.36  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 314  314  314  314  314  314  314  314  
R2 0.07  0.07  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.05  0.05  0.02  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
4.6.2 The effect of excess control rights and flotation on leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ 
tunneling 
    In this subsection we conduct a new regression that considers the interaction between excess 
control rights and flotation on excess leverage and controlling shareholder’s tunneling. The results are 
reported Table 13.  
    From this table we find that the interactive terms between excess control rights and full flotation 
only have an insignificant effect on excess leverage, which indicates that NTS reform has more 
influence on a firm’s leverage policy than the following full flotation of those vested shares. This is a 
reasonable result because controlling shareholders may expect that their shares would gradually be 
tradable after the NTS reform has been finalized, so they adjusted the firm’s leverage policy 
immediately afterwards. We also find from columns 5 to 6 of Table 13 that the interaction between 
excess control rights and full flotation on controlling shareholder’s tunneling is insignificant.   
    Our results show that controlling shareholders of firms with excess control rights reduce their 
tunneling activities and value-destroying leverage policies immediately after the NTS reform and 
these effects have continued since the lock-up period expired and NTS became fully tradable.  
 
Table 13 
The effect of excess control and full flotation on excess leverage and tunneling. This Table presents the regression results on 
the effect of excess control rights and flotation on firms’ excess leverage. Definitions of variables are reported in Appendix 
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A. Please note the number of observations is1475 because we exclude the observations before the NTS reform. P-values are 
displayed in italics.  
Var EX_BLEV EX_MLEV ORECTA 
EXCESS 0.26***  0.12***  0.06***  
0.00  0.01  0.00  
SDUMMY 0.03***  0.01  0.01***  
0.01  0.50  0.00  
REFORM 0.00  0.00  -0.03***  -0.03**  -0.00  -0.01  
0.88  0.81  0.01  0.04  0.22  0.19  
EXCESS*FLOTATION -0.05  0.01  -0.05  
0.62  0.94  0.15  
SDUMMY*FLOTATION -0.01  0.01  -0.00  
0.56  0.67  0.54  
CASHFLOW 0.11***  0.07***  0.03  0.01  -0.01  -0.02**  
0.00  0.01  0.31  0.82  0.12  0.03  
TANG 0.08***  0.08***  -0.01  -0.01  -0.04***  -0.04***  
0.00  0.00  0.57  0.51  0.00  0.00  
SIZE 0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  0.06***  -0.00  -0.00  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.15  0.34  
ROA -1.03***  -1.03***  -0.83***  -0.83***  -0.08***  -0.08***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
GROW 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  
0.21  0.22  0.29  0.31  0.57  0.58  
TAX -0.20  -0.13  -1.19***  -1.15***  -0.15*  -0.14  
0.54  0.71  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.11  
MANAGER 0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03  
0.98  0.91  1.00  0.85  0.23  0.22  
BOARDSIZE 0.01***  0.01***  0.00**  0.00**  -0.00***  -0.00***  
0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  
BOARDIN -0.13**  -0.14**  -0.05  -0.05  0.03*  0.03*  
0.02  0.02  0.33  0.29  0.06  0.07  
_cons -1.14***  -1.20***  -1.20***  -1.22***  0.08***  0.07***  
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1475  1475  1475  1475  1475  1475  
R2 0.31  0.30  0.36  0.36  0.12  0.12  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
5. Conclusion 
    Conventional wisdom predicts that controlling shareholders should use less debt to avoid external 
monitoring from creditors when creditor protection is strong. This paper examines the effect of excess 
control rights on the leverage decisions of Chinese non-SOEs before and after the NTS reform. We 
find that firms with more excess control rights actually borrow more debt, and controlling 
shareholders in these firms use these resources to tunnel rather than invest in new NPV-
positive projects. We have also shown that both excess leverage and tunneling by controlling 
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shareholders in firms with excess control rights decrease markedly shortly after NTS reform, 
even when the effect from market timing is controlled. Moreover, we provide evidence that 
the decrease in leverage policy and controlling shareholders’ tunneling in firms with more 
excess control rights after NTS reform is expected and welcomed by minority shareholders. 
We further find that after NTS reform, the decrease of excess leverage in firms with excess 
control rights is more pronounced in firms associated with more tunneling from controlling 
shareholders, that is, firms participating in related party transactions and with weaker bank 
monitoring, and that the performance of firms with more excess control rights also 
improved more than firms with less excess control rights.  
    Overall, our findings provide direct evidence that in emerging markets, when legal 
protection for both creditors and shareholders is weak, the value-destroying excess leverage 
policy is directly caused by controlling shareholders’ tunneling. More importantly, our 
findings document that this policy has reduced after NTS reform because the controlling 
shareholders’ tunneling decreases. This also results in a better market reaction to its related 
party transactions, and better firm performance. Our results suggest that the privatization 
process (such as NTS reform in China) in a transition economy is important for the 
development of capital market, which also improves firm value.  
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Appendix A. Variable Definition 
Variable names Variable definitions 
Panel A. Dependent variables 
EX_BLEV Book value based leverage for each firm minus the industrial median of book 
leverage of our universe of Chinese listed firms in a specific year. 
EX_MLEV Market value based leverage for each firm minus the industrial median of 
market leverage of our universe of Chinese listed firms in a specific year. 
Inter-corporate loans (ORECTA) Total other receivables to total assets. 
CAR [-1,+1] Market adjusted cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of 
related party transaction from -1 to +1 
CAR [-2, +2] Market adjusted cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of 
related party transaction from -2 to +2 
CAR [-5, +5] Market adjusted cumulative abnormal return around the announcement of 
related party transaction from -5 to +5 
CAR [MONTH 0] Size and market to book ratio adjusted abnormal return for the month of the 
announcement of related party transactions. 
Capital expenditure (CAPEXTA) Total capital expenditure to total assets 
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value/replacement value 
Share return (SR) Yearly market adjusted share return 
Return on assets (ROA) Total pre-tax profits to total assets 
Return on Equity (ROE) Net profit to total equity 
Panel B. Main independent variables 
Excess control right (EXCESS) Cash flow rights subtracted from control rights 
Separate dummy (SDUMMY) A dummy variable that equals 1 if the control rights of the ultimate 
shareholders exceed the cash flow rights 
After NTS reform dummy (REFORM) A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the observation is in the post reform 
period, and 0 if the observation is in the prior reform period. 
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After flotation dummy (FLOTATION) A dummy variable that equals to 1 for observations in flotation period, and 0 
for observations in the post reform period. 
Panel C. Classification variables 
RPT A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has related party transaction 
with controlling shareholders in any of the observation year, and 0 if firm 
never has related party transactions 
Political connections (PC) A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the CEO or chairman of the board is 
currently or was formerly an officer of the government or military or a deputy 
of the National/Provincial People’s Congress or People’s Political 
Consultative Conference and 0 otherwise. 
HSTB A dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firms’ ratio of short-term bank loans 
to total bank loans is above the median, and 0 if it’s below the median. 
Panel D. Other control variables 
Change in MTB (∆ MTB) Average market to book value ratio after the NTS reform minus average 
market to book value ratio before the NTS reform 
Change in share return (∆ SR) Average market adjusted share return after the NTS reform minus average 
market adjusted share return before the NTS reform 
Cash flow rights (CASHFLOW) Total cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder 
Tangibility (TANG) Total fixed assets to total assets 
Size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm 
Profitability (ROA) Total pre-tax profits to total assets 
Growth (GROW) Percentage change of sales revenue 
Effective tax rate (TAX) Total tax paid to total assets 
Managerial ownership (MANAGER) shares held by managers to total shares outstanding 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) Number of board of directors 
Board independence (BOARDIN) Number of independent board of directors to total number of board of 
directors 
Industry dummy (Industry) Dummy variables that reflect the firm's industry,  we adopt the industry 
classification provide by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), according to previous studies such as Li et al. (2008) 
Year dummy (Year) Dummy variables that reflect the year, 
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